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 This thesis will explore the problem of implicit bias and motivate a negative definition of 
implicit bias. The first chapter takes a survey of implicit bias research in psychology and engages 
with Tamar Gendler’s proposal of aliefs. Based on her description I argue that she is advocating 
for a model of implicit bias that consists of an addition or distortion to visual perception. I then 
explored implications of this model, including the tenacity of the additions to visual perception 
in the face of conflicting evidence and beliefs. Ultimately, I argue that her primary Cosmos Club 
example does not support her model of implicit bias and reinterpret her example to motivate a 
new model of implicitly biased perception.  
 Combining the Cosmos Club example with alternative epistemologies, the second chapter 
demonstrates the importance of perspectival knowledge in formulating a model of implicit bias. 
Attention research indicates that executive control of attentional processes is motivated by top-
down processes, and therefore the personal experiences, habits, and biases of the observer must 
necessarily be taken into account. Rather than focusing on individual differences in perceptual 
capacities and cognitive biases, I claimed that the occurrences of implicit bias in particular social 
groups (white, wealthy, etc.) demonstrates that the loci of measurable difference in perspective is 
at the intersection between different social groups determined by race, gender, age, sexuality, etc. 
After establishing the indispensability of group perspective, I then argued for a model of implicit 
bias as inattentional bias.  
 The third and final chapter will delve into the cognitive science research into attention, 
and inattentional blindness. It will draw a comparison between positive and negative implicit 
bias and bottom-up and top-down attentional processes on visual perception. I will propose a 
model of perception that provides an explanation for inattentional blindness that is in accordance 
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with the claims of epistemologists of ignorance that ignorance is active and can lead to implicit 
bias as de-selecting evidence. The thesis ends by suggesting what future research of negative 







 This thesis project’s aim is to distinguish between two types of implicit bias; positive 
implicit bias and negative implicit bias. Implicit bias is of rising concern and as such an attempt 
to understand its genesis, perpetuation, and manifestation is a vital project in philosophy as well 
as in psychology and cognitive science. Traditionally, implicit bias has been examined by 
measuring implicit attitudes towards social and ethnic groups. This is what I name positive 
implicit bias. This thesis will bring together contemporary research in psychological philosophy, 
feminist epistemology, epistemologies of ignorance, and cognitive science and in so doing I hope 
to motivate a definition of negative implicit bias that has hitherto not been discussed. This thesis 
will also discuss when and if we have an epistemological responsibility to confront our implicit 
biases.   
 The first chapter of this thesis will examine implicit bias from the perspective of Tamar 
Gendler, whose research has charged the implicit bias debate. Implicit bias is generally thought 
of as being epistemically vicious. Tamar Gendler challenges that assumption when she proposes 
an addition to the current mental ontology, “aliefs” and claims that these are responsible for 
implicit bias. Aliefs are automatically activated associative clusters containing a representative, 
affective, and behavioral component (R-A-B), and can be belief-occurrent or belief-discordant. 
Rather than claim aliefs as a whole are harmful to our epistemic practices, she claims that they 
are for the most part beneficial. Aliefs help us make fast time decisions, using little cognitive 
effort. In this paper I will give a brief account of current research of implicit associations and 
explore research by Gendler. Using a thought experiment, I will demonstrate that Gendler is 
using a model of implicit associations that indicates they serve as additions to perceptual 
experience. This model helps elucidate several examples of implicit associations and also 
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explains how these associations are not always conscious. I will demonstrate that Gendler also 
gives us a clear method of distinguishing epistemically harmful implicit associative content from 
epistemically beneficial content. Ultimately, I will argue that this distinction fails by offering an 
alternate interpretation of one of her prime examples. This alternate interpretation will show that 
implicit bias does not only occur when we are adding to our perception but also when we are 
subtracting from it. This indicates that failing to notice certain evidence is a failure in your 
epistemic duty, which can lead to implicit bias. In this sense what we do not see is just as 
significant as what we do see. 
 The second chapter will explore what alternative epistemologies have to contribute to this 
formulation of implicit bias as a systematic not seeing. This section begins with a move to 
perspectival knowledge in response to the concern that every person does not suffer from 
implicit bias. This opens up the question of who suffers from it, and why do they suffer it? 
Perspectivalism can illuminate how different perspectives can access different things as warrant. 
Perspectivalism in general focuses on individual perceptual abilities and access to warrant based 
on past experience and semantic knowledge. Utilizing perspectivalism, feminist standpoint 
theory argues that particular social groups can have access to knowledge that those outside of the 
group do not. This is also setting up a positive epistemic position in regards to what other people 
can know better than us. The final step is taken by looking to the epistemologists of ignorance 
that make the radical claim that ignorance is active. Ignorance is active in perception by causing 
an inattention to salient details in order to confirm a bias.  
 The third and final chapter will delve into the cognitive science research into attention, 
and inattentional blindness. It will draw a comparison between positive and negative implicit 
bias and bottom-up and top-down attentional processes on visual perception. I will propose a 
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model of perception that provides an explanation for inattentional blindness that is in accordance 
with the claims of epistemologists of ignorance that ignorance is active and can lead to implicit 
bias as de-selecting evidence. The thesis will end on a note regarding what future research of 









































IMPLICIT BIAS AND PERCEPTION: A CRITIQUE OF TAMAR GENDLER’S ALIEFS 
 
1.1.  An Opening Story 
A recent online video—though humorous—reveals something disturbing about American 
social cognition. The video, “Trump Glasses” depicts what the world looks like as seen through 
the eyes of supporters of then-presidential candidate Donald Trump (Manscuso 2016). The video 
begins with a young man discovering a pair of glasses lying next to him.  He puts them on and 
precedes to look at various groups of young adults having conversations around him.  
First, the young man turns towards two young black men seated on a nearby bench. 
Without the glasses, we see them as wearing ordinary clothing for their age, jeans and t-shirts, 
looking at a cell phone screen and discussing what they see there. However, the same scene 
through “Trump Glasses” involves a jarring transformation; the young black men are 
transformed into “thugs”, wearing gold chains, and holding guns with masks over their faces. 
One of them is even seen eating a watermelon.  Our young man removes the Trump glasses, and 
turns his attention to an unremarkable man whose appearance suggests he is of Middle Eastern 
descent. He too is gazing into his cellphone screen; through the Trump Glasses, however, he is 
wearing a gutra and petting a goat with enthusiasm. The same sequence is repeated with an 
Asian man who the trump glasses transform into a samurai. Lastly, the young man goes to the 
bathroom and with some trepidation peers at himself with the glasses. What he sees is not the 
Mexican American that he is, but a mariachi musician complete with sombrero and maracas. 
Horrified, he throws the glasses away.  
While probably intended for a good laugh at the expense of Trump supporters, the video 
may also tell us something serious about social cognition with respect to racial and ethnic 
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groups.  Specifically, the Trump glasses serve as a metaphor for implicit racialized perception1 
Social psychologists who study racial and social cognition explore how information regarding 
different racial and social groups is processed, stored, and applied in social contexts. While we 
want to believe that we treat people fairly and equally, and not as if the embodiment of 
stereotypes, research on implicit associations indicates that stereotypes are so prevalent in 
society that we are influenced by them whether or not we are conscious of them2 The question of 
how associations about social groups interact with cognitive processes is important for social 
psychologists, but also the philosophers, and anyone concerned about social justice. This is 
because it is not sufficient to have egalitarian beliefs, we must also be on our guard against 
associations which might influence our behavior and perception.  
The Trump Glasses scenario present us with a visual metaphor of how implicit 
associations shape perception, and how we might become aware of our perception as stereotype-
laden perception. This “thought experiment” gives us a way to think of racial and social 
associations in terms of their effect on perception, rather than focusing solely on how they occur 
in cognition3.  If we take the lenses to be implicit associations, the latter distort perception by 
adding to the scene what is objectively not there.  On the other hand, since these association 
overlay perception, they may in principle be subtracted, we may restore objective vision by 
                                               
1 Research on the amygdala demonstrates differences in the reaction when confronted with 
difference races, for discussion of how racial perceptions develop through adolescence see 
Telzer, Eva H., Humphreys, Kathryn L., Shapiro, Mor., & Tottenham, Nim. (2013). 
2 For evidence demonstrating that biases can be implicit, automatically activated, and working 
unconsciously see Devine, P. G. (1989), Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C. & 
Williams, C. J. (1995), and Greenwald, A. G. & Banaji, M. R. (1995). 
3 Racialized perception can be very dangerous. Studies have shown that participants who were 
shown pictures of black faces (compared to those who were shown white faces), were faster to 
identify pictures of guns as guns and were more likely to falsely identify pictures of tools as 
guns, Payne et al. (2002) Conrey et al. (2005). 
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removing the trump glasses…if only we knew how. Perhaps this may be achieved by attempting 
to find a subject that is stereotype neutral.  
While wearing the glasses our young man also views a group of five white adults. 
Viewed through the glasses they are wearing polo shirts, drinking Starbucks coffee, and 
generally appearing like liberal upper middle class whites. Without the glasses they are wearing 
jeans and hoodies. This is a less drastic change than we see in the case of the black men and the 
other minority groups.  What does it mean that the stereotype of what it means to be white is 
more difficult to pin down? Charles Mills discusses how whites in our society are in a sense, 
unmarked. Whites do not see themselves in racial terms which emphasizes individualistic 
explanations for economic and social achievement (Mills 2007). 
The white case perhaps provides us with a neutral point of view, a perception that is not 
laden with implicit associations or racial stereotypes. The suggestion of a neutral point of view 
indicates that the model of implicit associations is one of addition to perception. Guns and chains 
were added to the black men, a samurai sword to the man of Asian descent, and a gutra and goat 
added to the young man of Middle Eastern ancestry. The model of implicit associations as 
additions to perception is adopted by psychologist and philosopher Tamar Szabó Gendler. 
Implicit bias is generally thought of as being epistemically vicious. Tamar Gendler 
challenges that assumption when she proposes an addition to the current mental ontology, 
“aliefs” and claims that these are responsible for implicit bias. Aliefs are automatically activated 
associative clusters containing a representative, affective, and behavioral component (R-A-B), 
and can be belief-occurent or belief-discordant. Rather than claim aliefs as a whole are harmful 
to our epistemic practices, she claims that they are for the most part beneficial. Aliefs help us 
make fast time decisions, using little cognitive effort. In this paper I will give a brief account of 
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current research of implicit associations and explore the research performed by Gendler. Using 
the above thought experiment, I will demonstrate that Gendler is using a model of implicit 
associations that indicates they serve as additions to perceptual experience. This model helps 
elucidate several examples of implicit associations and also explains how these associations are 
not always conscious. I will demonstrate that Gendler also gives us a clear method of 
distinguishing epistemically harmful implicit associative content from epistemically beneficial 
content. Ultimately, I will offer an alternative interpretation of Gendler’s prime example to 
demonstrate why her distinction fails. This alternate interpretation will show that implicit bias 
does not only occur when we are adding to our perception but also when we are subtracting from 
it. This indicates that failing to notice certain evidence is a failure in your epistemic duty, which 
can lead to implicit bias. In this sense what we do not see is just as significant as what we do see. 
1.2. Implicit Associations and Bias 
Recent empirical evidence to support the claim that racial cognition is widespread and 
implicit, that is, it contrasts explicitly held beliefs regarding racial categories. This conclusion is 
established through laboratory evidence such as the IAT and statistical patterns of behavior. The 
Implicit Association Test4 (IAT) is a way to indirectly measure implicit attitudes. Rather than ask 
participants how they feel about members of particular subject groups, the test measures the 
speed and accuracy with which the participant can associate certain categories and words. 
 In one version of the IAT, the participants might be presented with two columns, “bad” 
and “good,” and are presented with various white and black faces. They are asked to put the 
                                               
4 The IAT has various different formats and tests for implicit associations in many different 
social groups including: race, age, sexuality, gender, and religion. The most referenced of these 
is the black/white racial test. The test asks the participant to sort words into columns and tests the 
speed and accuracy of these attempts.  
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black faces in the “good” column and the white faces in the “bad” column. Then they are asked 
to do the inverse. Studies show that 70% of white participants can more easily associate black 
faces with negative words and white faces with positive words, and more disturbingly: all races 
share this difficulty (Brownstein 2015). The data collection from the IAT is widely taken to 
establish that implicit associations are active in cognition.5  
It is important to emphasize that implicit associations are not inherently bad. As the work 
of Daniel Kahneman demonstrates, implicit associations underlie a vast number of cognitive 
processes.  In system one cognition, or fast thinking, associations lead us to arrive at “snap” 
judgements faster and with minimum cognitive effort. This is beneficial in any situation in which 
it is too time consuming or cognitively taxing to engage in slow reflective thinking.  This is the 
system that allows you to detect hostility in a voice, to turn quickly towards a sudden noise, or 
even drive a car on an empty road.6 However, the same processes that often lead to successful 
and efficient cognition, can lead us to be unfairly biased towards particular social groups 
An example of a statistical pattern of behavior is the oft repeated resume example in 
which employers are not judging in the way they should, on the basis of expertise, but on the 
basis of racial-sounding names (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). This is an issue both for 
rationality (we are judging about the wrong thing) and morality (we are treating like, equally 
                                               
5 Those that argue against the conclusions drawn by the IAT argue that it is not obvious what it is 
that the test is measuring and also accuse advocates of the tests as exaggerating the consequence 
of their findings. For these arguments see Blanton & Jaccard (2008), Blanton & Jaccard (2006), 
Fazio & Olson, (2003), and Karpinski & Hilton (2001). Even if IAT-skeptics are correct in 
arguing that the test is not measuring what its proponents claim, they would still have to come up 
with an alternative explanation for the existence of the patterns of behavior. For an argument to 
this effect see Nozek, Greenwald & Sriram (2006). 
6 System 1 also controls things such as detecting that one object is closer to you than another, 
understanding simple sentences, recalling the answer to simple mathematical problems (2+2=?), 
and recognizing stereotypes. Daniel Kahneman (2011, p. 23). 
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qualified candidates, in an unlike way).  However, we are often perfectly unaware that we may 
acting either irrationally or unethically. Hiring managers in the resume test report making 
decisions on the basis of rational criterion.  They are unaware of the discord between implicit 
associations and their explicitly held beliefs regarding those social groups.  
Returning to Trump Glasses, we can now explore some further implications of this 
presentation of implicit associations.   Recall that above we said that “Trump Glasses” provide a 
picture where our implicit associations add something to our perception. How should we 
understand the nature of this addition? Do these association overlay perception, structure it, and 
are they “constitutive elements”?  Do we ever have perception that is not IA-laden?  
The task of defining the role of associations in perception and cognition is an important 
one for epistemic and practical reasons.  For example, if we are capable of taking off our Trump 
Glasses then we have a moral obligation to do so. If we cannot take the glasses off; we would 
have to discover the means through which we can compensate for these IA when they interfered 
with good epistemic and moral outcomes, which would be a matter of dulling the effect these 
biases have on our interactions and judgments rather than eliminating them7. Recent work in 
psychology and epistemology by Tamar Gendler may be of some help in providing a theoretical 
account of the way that IA structure cognition and perception.  In particular, her work helps us to 
think through the question of whether we can, in principle, take off our Trump Glasses. 
In the succeeding sections, I am going to argue that Gendler’s account of aliefs and 
beliefs follows the model set forth by the Trump Glasses of implicit associations as addition to 
our perceptions. Then I am going to demonstrate why this account is problematic.  I will also 
                                               
7 Researchers have found that stereotyping and prejudice can be countered by self-regulation 




explore how Gendler’s account might provide a way out of this trap by providing a standard by 
which we can distinguish between acceptable implicit associative content and content that 
distorts perception. Ultimately we will see that Gendler’s account fails to encompass all cases of 
implicit bias, though it does successfully account for some. Those cases which cannot be 
explained by Gendler can be explained by an epistemology of ignorance, but that argument will 
be given in the next chapter of this thesis. 
1.3.  Introducing Alief 
According to Gendler, “to have an alief is to have an innate or habitual propensity to 
respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. In paradigm cases and on strict usage, this 
response involves an automatized representational-affective-behavioral triad”, which I will refer 
to as RAB’s (T. Gendler 2011, 41). Aliefs represent “some object or concept or situation or 
circumstance, perhaps propositionally, perhaps non-propositionally, perhaps conceptually, 
perhaps nonconceptually” (T. S. Gendler 2008, 9). They are intrinsically affective, meaning that 
the representation of content triggers an emotional state related to that representation. This affect 
will ready an automatic behavioral response. The representation, affect, and behavior associated 
cluster is the standard structure of aliefs and Gendler’s explanations thus follow this three part 
formula.8 
To illustrate the distinction between alief and belief, Gendler provides the example of a 
person feeling fear on the Grand Canyon Skywalk. While the person has the belief that the glass 
under his/her feet is stable, they are still afraid and clutch the railing as if to keep themselves 
                                               
8 Eric Mandelbaum challenged this formulation of aliefs. He argues that if aliefs are 
propositional then they are indistinguishable from beliefs. If aliefs are associative then they 
cannot perform the explanatory work that Gendler sets out for them. I am not going to address 
this issue here. I am taking Gendler’s account of alief as providing a new addition to mental 
ontology. For the argument see Mandelbaum (2013). 
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from falling. For Gendler, this is an instance of a belief-discordant alief. The RAB content is 
comprised of the visual appearance as of a cliff, the feeling of fear and the motor routine of 
clutching the railing, all while currently holding the justified true belief that the skywalk is safe 
(T. S. Gendler 2008, 2). We have all experienced that type of discord within ourselves, most 
often in cases involving a phobia. For an alternate example, consider the difficulties in throwing 
darts at a dart board that is decorated with a picture of a loved one. Throwing the dart towards 
the picture is not easy to do. It is not that you are scared that you will actually hurt your loved 
one by throwing a dart at the board, but the reluctance to do violence to the image of a person 
you love is the result of RABs. The RABs might contain the visual of your mother, feeling of 
protect!, reluctance to throw the dart.  
One might argue that something like RABs are happening in cognition but that they could 
be the result of other mental states, and there is not much reason to posit a new ontology that 
could not be explained in pre-existing terms. The RAB resists such moves to separate it into its 
composite parts.9 Without delving into detail about how Gendler makes the case for aliefs not 
being reducible to, nor identical with, other mental states such as imagination, I will provide here 
the evidence she uses to separate beliefs and aliefs. Though Gendler does not detail exactly what 
her position is on the construction of belief, we can only assume that it does not contain RABs. 
She identifies two properties of beliefs that are not shared by aliefs; they are reality-sensitive and 
                                               
9 Aliefs seem to fit into a picture of dual process theory in which cognition happens in two 
systems. System 1 is characteristic of fast time responses. It is generally low-effort, implicit, 
associative, pragmatic, automatic, perceptual, unconscious or preconscious, and the default 
process. System 2 is slow, conscious, high effort, abstract, logical, explicit and reflective. If 
aliefs are placed in this model then they would belong in system 1 and beliefs (as Gendler has 
described them) would be in system 2. The former characterized by their quick activation and 
high margin of error, and the latter by slower more deliberate thinking. For further discussion of 
dual process theory see Daniel Kahneman Thinking Fast and Slow, (2011).  
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they are accepted (T. S. Gendler 2008, 14). What beliefs seem to be constitutive of is the 
acceptance of the representation (R) as part of one’s real environment, and beliefs can be true or 
false because they are reality-sensitive.10 Aliefs and beliefs both share the R component of the 
RAB structure suggesting they are both grounded in perception, but where beliefs can be either 
true or false, aliefs cannot.  Aliefs are adding content to the perception and therefore the 
perception itself cannot be taken as evidence of its truth or falsity in the same way it can for 
beliefs. To further this point, Gendler posits that aliefs do not rely on reasons but something 
Gendler refers to as “eason”. An eason is “something that is not sufficiently well-conceptualized 
to call a reason but that (in a way in between a reasony and a causy fashion) eases us towards a 
certain outlook on the world” (T. Gendler 2011, 51). An eason is more substantial than an 
instinctual reaction but somewhat less than an actual reason that provides justification to beliefs. 
We have talked about how aliefs can be in conflict with beliefs but aliefs do not always 
cause discord. Aliefs can be in tandem with our beliefs and when they are, they allow us to make 
quick reactions due to the automaticity of the associated behavioral response. Gendler claims that 
aliefs are the result of the beneficial ability to categorize objects into categories such as, things 
that pose a danger to me however, this beneficial cognitive apparatus does not only categorize 
objects but people as well. This is the reasoning behind Gendler’s claim that aliefs are 
responsible for instances of implicit bias. Stereotypes are a direct result in categorizing people in 
society. Pair stereotypes with an automated response and you have a recipe for implicit bias.  
                                               
10 Gendler is adopting a representational account of belief. There is controversy over this picture 
of belief. The instrumentalist view of Daniel Dennett would not support the distinction she is 
drawing between alief and belief. For space considerations I will not argue Gendler’s position 
against the instrumentalist objections here. The burden of proof should fall on the instrumentalist 
to provide an account of implicit bias. 
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Gendler identifies aliefs as being responsible for things such as stereotype threat, difficulties in 
cross-race face identification, and cognitive depletion following interracial interaction. 
 Gendler additionally claims that the ability to form associative clusters like aliefs is on a 
beneficial one and to attempt to change them would result in an epistemic cost (T. Gendler 2011, 
23). In order to get rid of an unwanted alief one would have to not be attentive to evidence (such 
as base-rates). If you instead wanted to resist the automatic behavior response they entail you 
would need to expend cognitive energy. This second form of epistemic cost is related to the 
persistence of aliefs in the face of contradictory beliefs.  
1.4. Tenacious ABs and Conflicting Beliefs 
The reality-insensitive character of aliefs owes to their persistence when confronted with 
conflicting beliefs. I will now provide two separate examples to illustrate this. Suppose that I am 
walking down the street at night and hear footsteps behind me. I turn, see that the person is a 
black man and I cross to the other side of the street. The RAB content would be black man, 
danger!, and move. It is rational to feel in danger in this situation and to cross the street. I am 
alone, it is dark, I am aware of statistics that more crimes are committed at night when the victim 
is alone, and I am also savvy to statistics that lead to the conclusion that black men commit more 
crimes than other racial groups. In this example my beliefs and aliefs are accordant.  
Let us contrast this with an alternate but similar example. Let us say that I am sitting 
alone in the cafeteria and a black man is standing near me. I see him, suspect he is a student who 
is in the cafeteria for the same reasons I am, and at the same time, find myself reaching down to 
secure my bag. In this case, my belief and my alief are discordant. In the cafeteria example, I do 
not have a belief that the man poses no danger to me, rather I have an alief that causes me to 
perceive him as a threat. With that in mind, I still reach down to secure my bag. I will refer to 
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this phenomena as Tenacious ABs. The ABs are tenacious in the sense that even though I can be 
aware that my perceptions might be unfaithful to reality, as in the cafeteria example, I cannot 
prevent them from directing my actions. The name refers to the affective and behavior 
component of aliefs. The representation component has not been included because the 
representation that occurs via perception serves as the ground for both beliefs and aliefs. The 
representation of a black man has changed in both instances but the AB associations have 
remained the same and therefore, my response to the representation is the same.  
There is reason to suspect that perception is not separate from judgment. In both 
examples above the perception is the judgement, the judgement being that the black man 
presents a danger to me. In the first example, slow rational deliberation would tell me that I am 
justified in crossing the street but that is not what dictated my behavior. The judgement was 
made in the seeing of the man. If my aliefs are active in the perception itself, then the perception 
cannot serve as the ground for aliefs. There would also be no clear distinction between what 
might count as alief and what would count as a belief because, beliefs might contain an aliefy 
component via the perception that is laden with aliefs which is serving as the basis for belief 
formation. With implicit bias and Tenacious ABs in mind let us return to the Trump Glasses 
thought experiment and see what clarification we can provide.  
The savvy observer is confronted with the disturbing awareness that his perceptions 
might be influenced by something he is unaware of by means of the disparity between his 
perception with the glasses on and with them off. The perceptual aliefs regarding social groups in 
this case are an instance of adding something to the perception such as the man of Middle 
Eastern descent having a goat, and the black men wearing masks. For the savvy observer, the 
Trump Glasses serve as a mechanism for revealing their aliefs because those aliefs are discordant 
15 
 
with their explicit beliefs. It is obvious that the savvy observer does not endorse the stereotypes 
he is viewing, yet he has encoded them nonetheless. When he takes the glasses off he 
experiences “reality” and forms perceptual beliefs based on it, when the glasses are on he is 
viewing the hidden influence his aliefs have on his perception.  
Considering what we discovered in the problem of Tenacious ABs, the question we posed 
earlier of whether we can take our Trump Glasses off with an alief view of implicit associations 
seems to be no. If aliefs are active in perception in such a way that beliefs can be based on them, 
and they cannot be changed by conflicting second order beliefs, then it does not follow that they 
can be taken off to reveal a perception that is not laden with implicit association. That is not to 
say that it is impossible to attempt to fight against the Tenacious ABs if we become aware of 
them. The conclusion to be drawn here is that the perception is not providing a neutral 
foundation for the justification for beliefs because the aliefs are active in the perception itself.  
Since we cannot take off our Trump Glasses then how can we distinguish between what 
may be good associative content and what is harmful associative content? It seems that Gendler 
did not help us with identifying implicit bias because aliefs, which were supposed to serve as our 
implicit bias as addition to perception, can also share the property of addition with beliefs. That 
being said, Gendler still might be able to provide us with some clarification.  
1.5.  John Hope Franklin at the Cosmos Club 
With our emphasis on perception in mind let us consider one of Gendler’s examples in 
her article “On the Epistemic Cost of Implicit Bias”. Gendler tells a story about John Hope 
Franklin and the Cosmos Club. It is as follows; a woman is attending an event at the prestigious 
Cosmos Club, a social organization in Washington DC. She hands her coat check to a man she 
takes as an employee of the club and tells him to bring her the coat. The man she hands the coat 
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check to informs her that if she will give her coat check to an attendant, who are in uniform, she 
will receive her coat. Little did she know the man was John Hope Franklin who was hosting a 
dinner that night at the Cosmos Club in honor of receiving the Presidential Medal of Freedom (T. 
Gendler 2011, 35). She took a quick glance at him and determined that he must be an employee 
because he is a black man at a club which has in the past been attended exclusively by whites. 
Obviously the woman made a mistake and Gendler wants to explore what kind of mistake 
that was. Gendler states that the mistake is not one of base-rate neglect because it is the case that 
there are few, if any, black members of the Cosmos Club at that time. She quickly consulted the 
data from her experience indicating that there are little to no black members of the club, and that 
there are quite a few black employees of the club. Seeing a black man she thought that this man 
must be an employee. Gendler says this woman made a mistake but it was not an epistemically 
vicious mistake (T. Gendler 2011, 36). This was just one of those instances in which reality does 
not line up with rational expectation. 
Gendler’s reliance on base-rate data is important. Base-rates are statistics used to describe 
the percentage of a population that demonstrates some characteristic. Base-rates give us 
objective verification for our inferences.11 Base-rate neglect, also called the base-rate fallacy, 
occurs when an agent is provided with relevant base rate data (general statistics) and specific 
information only pertaining to a particular case, and uses the particular information rather than 
the base-rate data to come to a conclusion. Stereotypes have a way of making us neglect base-
rate information. Stereotypes serve as representatives of certain social groups. When we are 
                                               
11 Base-rates are also considered to be prior probabilities (i.e. the probability of something 
occurring based on past observations). This is derived from Bayes Theorem which is still a 
prevalent way to evaluate competing hypotheses in the scientific community. For further 
discussion of Bayes Theorem and prior probabilities see Hajek and Hartmann (2010). 
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making a judgment about a person, their success or failure to serve as a representative of the 
considered group will determine the judgment about whether they belong.  
Kahneman, in his discussion of prediction by representativeness, provides the example of 
a young woman riding the New York subway reading The New York Times. Given the choice 
between guessing the girl has a PhD, and the girl does not have a college degree, the average 
person would probably guess that the girl has a PhD when judging by representativeness. 
However, statistics indicate that more nongraduates ride the subway than people with PhDs and 
therefore the second option is more likely (Kahneman 2011, 148-49). Being attentive to base-
rates is more difficult than judging by representation and is more easily abandoned when given a 
situation in which they are not in accordance.12 The first problem with representativeness is that 
is leads you to ignore base-rate data, the second problem is that is causes insensitivity to the 
quality of evidence (Kahneman 2011, 150). You are more likely to make a quick decision that 
accords with your stereotype than to take the time to analyze if the evidence is trustworthy.  
With Kahneman’s exposition of base-rates in mind, we can analyze the Cosmos Club 
woman. Can the mistake she made be attributed to implicit bias? Gendler states that the existence 
of social categories gives rise to implicit bias. Encoding information regarding social categories 
also includes encoding the stereotypes that are attributed to them. The woman at the club is not 
guilty of base-rate neglect because it is the case that there are few (if any) black members of the 
club, which means she is properly encoding data regarding social categorization however, a 
common symptom of implicit bias is ignoring base-rate data in order to support a bias. Gendler 
agrees with Kahneman that attentiveness to base-rates “minimizes your likelihood of making 
                                               
12 In terms of system 1 and system 2, judging probability by representativeness is a function of 
the system 1 cognitive process. System 2 is responsible for attentiveness to base-rates.  
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mistakes in situations where you are operating under something less than certainty” (Kahneman 
2011, 2). Gendler’s judgment of the woman is that she was acting rationally, and not guilty of 
implicit bias, because she was not guilty of base-rate neglect. Therein we might have the answer 
to our question about how to distinguish between epistemically good associative content and bad. 
The associative content, of which beliefs and aliefs are probably composed, is okay as long as it 
does not encourage you to ignore base-rates.  
Gendler provided a clean picture of the difference between implicit bias and regular 
associative content. We now have a model of implicit bias in terms of addition and I suppose it is 
time to wrap up this paper and call it a day. If only it were that easy. This would in fact be a 
lovely solution to the problem. However, I think it is not the right solution. This can be 
demonstrated by providing an alternative interpretation of the Cosmos Club example by recalling 
Kahneman’s second problem of representativeness. The woman at the Cosmos Club was not 
simply being attentive to base-rates but actually had to perform a lot of epistemic work to make 
Franklin appear as an employee. She erased the indicators of his being a guest such as his tuxedo 
and perceived him in terms of one trait; his race. The woman is not being attentive to base-rates, 
rather her desire to confirm the base-rates required her to be inattentive to evidence. She is guilty 
of performing perceptual neglect in order to confirm her bias. The woman is not adding 
something to her perceptual experience such as the thug clothing or the goat. Rather she is not 
paying attention to objects available for her observation that would have led her to a correct 
belief about him. 
Being confronted by a man that does not fit into her picture of the world should be 
something that provokes her into reassessment of the situation at hand, and her mistake is that 
she does not do so. It is clear that we tend toward preserving our beliefs until we are forced to 
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call them into question.13 If the woman was doing her epistemic duty this would have been a 
moment to call her beliefs into question. The fact that she does not makes her guilty of not 
seeing.  
Let us suppose that the woman actually did notice Franklin’s tuxedo. Gendler claims that 
the woman is, “rational to assume that even though he was wearing a suit rather than a uniform, 
he was nonetheless an employee rather than a host” (T. Gendler 2011, 35). It seems that his outfit 
is inconsequential to the judgment regarding Franklin because base-rates are only evidence that 
is required to be rational. The problem with Gendler’s example is her overreliance on base-rate 
information. There are three steps in using base-rates to make a judgment: deciding that a base-
rate is necessary, making sure you are considering the right base-rate, and then utilizing that 
base-rate correctly to make a judgment. Gendler already assumes that we need a base-rate. As we 
saw in the last chapter, Gendler agrees that when we are faced with a situation where we have 
limited information base-rates are the way to go14. Conceding to the point that a base-rate is the 
proper way to reach a judgment, is the Cosmos Club woman being attentive to the right base-
rate? The Trump Glasses examples are instances of being guilty of neglecting base-rates and 
endorsing stereotypes (very few Mexicans are Mariachi musicians, few black men are thugs, few 
Arabs are terrorists). It is unclear in the Cosmos club example whether the woman is having an 
alief that causes her to come to the wrong conclusion about Franklin. Perhaps her alief is her 
reluctance to look to other base-rates to make her decision. 
Consider another possible example: Franklin attends the Cosmos Club in a clown outfit. 
Is the woman still rational to assume Franklin is an attendant? If the woman is attending to the 
                                               
13 See Kahneman (2001) for further discussion. 
14 Koehler (1996) offers significant critique of relying of base-rates because they do not map 
unambiguously onto real world situations.  
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base-rate regarding race membership to the club then she would still be rational. However, if she 
considers the prior probability of clowns as attendants at fancy clubs, then she would not be 
rational to assume that Franklin is an attendant. Gendler and does not stop to consider a situation 
in which a person is faced with various base-rates that might lead to conflicting conclusions. This 
may be taken to imply that Gendler is relying on an aperspectival view of epistemic justification. 
The next chapter will critique the aperspectival approach to knowledge practices and Gendler’s 
glossing over of perceptual warrant in the Cosmos Club example.  
In conclusion, I have argued that the picture of implicit bias as the addition of associative 
content (RABs) Gendler provides is inadequate. While her account can elucidate some instances 
where implicit and explicit beliefs are in conflict (e.g. the Skywalk) her account cannot give a 
satisfactory answer to question raised by the woman at the Cosmo Club, namely, what is the 
nature of her error in misidentifying a tuxedo-ed scholar with a coat-room attendant.  Because 
Gendler takes implicit bias to be a case of adding, rather than subtracting, she misses the source 
of the women’s error—or at least the error that may plausibly be attributed to her.  Namely, that 
she fails to be attentive to the right sort of details. While, as I argue, the addition model may be 
sufficient to explain some instances of bias, it certainly cannot account for all of them. 
 It is not only what we see that is important, it is also what we do not see. Indeed, this is 
the very claim defended by theorists working on an epistemology of ignorance. Connecting these 
two, seemingly very different, approaches will be achieved by focusing on the role perception is 
playing in both accounts. The next chapter will tackle the task of developing an alternative 





 CHAPTER 2 
PERSPECTIVALISM AND EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE: THINKING 
IMPLICIT BIAS NEGATIVELY 
 
The last chapter left off with the claim that what we do not see is just as telling (and 
potentially epistemically and ethically perilous as what we do see. Gendler provides us with a 
model of implicit bias as an addition or distortion of perception.  We saw this in the case of the 
Cosmos club woman, whom Gendler deemed was not guilty of implicit bias because her 
perception was not distorted. The woman was performing her epistemic duty because her 
decision was influenced by her base-rate data regarding the Cosmos Club membership. However, 
I have shown with my reinterpretation of the Cosmos Club example, it is equally plausible to 
think that the woman at the Cosmos Club was not tracking base-rates, but was judging according 
to her bias regardless of the information available to her. She was guilty of de-selecting 
information in order to confirm her bias. In this case, we would have a case of implicit bias as 
inattention. My point in the last chapter was not to imply that one must choose between 
Gendler’s definition of implicit bias and my own—but rather to argue that the case of the 
Cosmos Club arguably did not exemplify Gendler’s definition, but rather motivated my own 
definition.  
This chapter will focus on drawing a contrast between positive and negative types of 
implicit bias (addition and subtraction). In this chapter I will argue that Gendler ought to be 
concerned about implicit bias that occurs via inattention. The difference in understanding when 
implicit bias via aliefs and when implicit bias via inattentional blindness is occurring will 
determine the sorts of strategies (if any) we use to overcome it. For Gendler, differences in 
perceptual ability or practice will not alter the aliefs that are causing implicit bias. We can only 
fight against them or not encode important base-rate and background information, both of which 
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will incur an epistemic cost. I will argue that the epistemologists of ignorance are forwarding an 
account of implicit bias as inattentional blindness. For epistemologists of ignorance, implicit bias 
is a result of failing to see what should be obvious to a virtuous perceiver. This failure to see is 
not passive, rather it is the active selecting of information that reinforces your privilege. As such, 
we do not incur an epistemic cost from attempting to eradicate our implicit biases rather it is our 
epistemic duty to do so.  
 Implicit bias understood in the negative sense relies on the claim that the manner in 
which we allocate our attention can demonstrate a bias. The allocation of attention is 
perspectival. It is unique to the task at hand and influenced by the observer’s past experiences 
and semantic knowledge. Gendler’s claim that attentiveness to base-rates serves as a criterion for 
determining acceptable epistemic practices does not take into account that verification might be 
different for individuals in certain epistemic positions. Gendler is not concerned with particular 
histories of experience which can lead to different perceptual abilities and different entitlements 
of things as warrant. Gendler’s account relies on the claim that we are all encoding the same 
base-rates regarding racial and social categories by virtue of all participating in the same society. 
This reinforces an aperspectival account of epistemic justification because base-rates have 
democratic accessibility as warrants.  
 For Gendler, base-rates provide epistemic warrant however Gendler ignores perceptual 
warrant. Franklin’s tuxedo would provide a perceptual warrant for judging him to be a member 
of the club rather than an attendant. We can be fairly certain however, that the attendants would 
not have mistaken Franklin for one of their own even though they have the same access to base-
rate information and would, on Gendler’s reasoning, be rational to make that judgement. A focus 
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on perspectivalism and the different perceptual warrants that can be found between members of 
differing social groups might provide us some answers here.  
 The first part of this chapter will look into the claims of perspectivalism and how 
perspective, and perceptual warrant, can be determined by your social group. The work of 
feminist standpoint theorists claims that the social position that you occupy can give you access 
to knowledge that those outside of your position do not. Occupying a less privileged social 
position can actually put you in a better epistemic position.15 Elucidating how members of 
different social groups can have different access to things as warrant, and thus attend to different 
stimuli (or particular features of those stimuli), is imperative to our exploration of negative 
implicit bias. 
  The next section of this chapter will demonstrate how perspectivalism is used in 
epistemologies of ignorance, drawing a critical distinction between feminist standpoint theory 
and epistemologies of ignorance.16 Rather than conceiving of perspectivalism as describing a 
situation in which someone can have a better epistemological standpoint due to their membership 
in a group as the feminist standpoint theorist propose17, epistemologists of ignorance 
demonstrate how a position of social privilege requires an active editing of perceptual experience 
to create ignorance. This ignorance keeps the privileged ignorant of the conditions of those in 
oppressed groups, as well as keeping them ignorant of their status as oppressors. This active 
                                               
15 I am not claiming that being in a marginalized social location necessarily implies that you are 
in a better epistemological position. 
16 That is not to say that feminist standpoint theory and epistemologies of ignorance are wholly 
separate doctrines. In fact, there is a great deal of overlap between them. Epistemologies of 
ignorance build off the foundation that is set by the feminist standpoint theorists.  
17 A group can mean a specific gender, ethnicity, socio-economic position, etc. 
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editing manifests as inattentional blindness and is perhaps more dangerous than the implicit bias 
which is the result of aliefs that Gendler proposes.  
2.1  Feminist Standpoint Theory and Perspectivalism  
 Alternative epistemologies18 arise from the concern that the dominant epistemology of 
today is an epistemology of exclusion. The typical candidates for exclusion, be it from 
knowledge, equal rights, or respect, are those that do not fall under the category of “white male”. 
This exclusion can occur in a few ways such as when claims made by members of oppressed 
groups are not given credence because they do not cohere with the dominant view. Examples of 
this include the difficulty in getting women’s testimony about rape and abuse heard, and how we 
are still unwilling to accept the testimony from individuals who are profiled by the police 
because they belong to a particular race or community.  
The critical claim of traditional epistemologies that feminist epistemologists are attacking 
is aperspectivalism, in which any knower can be substituted for another. It is imperative for us to 
challenge this assumption as well. This is particularly relevant to us because it is not the case that 
everyone is suffering from implicit bias. The woman at the Cosmos Club suffers from implicit 
bias not because she lives in an unjust society but because she is wealthy and white in a society 
in which being wealthy and white is the highest position of privilege. It is hard to fathom that the 
black men who actually were attendants would mistake John Hope Franklin for an attendant 
because he also happens to be black. 
                                               
18 Epistemologies of ignorance and feminist epistemologies are often referred to as “alternative 
epistemologies” though I think this does an injustice to the project. To call them alternative 
epistemologies sounds too reminiscent of the problem of “alternative facts”. The feminist 
standpoint’s project is aiming at creating a knowledge for women however this is not to say it is 
incommensurate with other epistemology. 
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On what grounds do feminist standpoint theorists deny the viability of aperspectival 
knowledge? Feminist epistemologists identify two main problems with the aperspectivalism 
assumption. The first is that it applies only to very simple examples (is it a barn, or a barn 
façade?) but it cannot tackle the complex situations in which knowing or not knowing can have 
real consequences. The question of whether or not someone is trustworthy is one such example 
of a complex epistemological question that cannot be tackled by aperspectival views of 
knowledge practices because a judgment of this sort relies on emotion and intuition as much as 
background knowledge of that person. The second, is that aperspectivalism divorces the knower 
from the community such that a discussion about the politics of knowledge is impossible. This 
obfuscates the connection knowledge has to power. According to feminist epistemologists, the 
knowledge you have access to is directly influenced by the social position you occupy therefore 
knowledge and power have a direct relationship.  
 Lorraine Code is famous for critiquing aperspectivalism and argues that the relationship 
between knowledge and ignorance is problematic, “In fact, integral to the structure of 
mainstream epistemology is this either/or (either knowledge or ignorance) structure that is too 
crude to engage well with the complexities—the ecological questions and the responsibility 
imperatives, both epistemic and moral—invoked by ignorance” (Code 2012). She further 
elaborates that there is an asymmetrical relationship between knowledge and ignorance in that 
having one does not necessarily displace the other, though it can. Code asserts the political 
investedness of most knowledge-producing activity and insists upon the accountability – the 
epistemic responsibilities – of knowing subjects to the community, not just to the evidence” 
(Code 2012, 89). This can be taken to imply that there is a moral as well as epistemological 
component to knowledge practices.  
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 Rebecca Kukla’s perspectivalism, which will be gone into more detail below, argues that 
perceiving accurately includes perceiving morally important features of others. An example of 
this is having the experience to perceive members of the gay community, who purposefully 
display particular features so that they might be distinguished by other members of their 
subculture (Kukla 2002).  The woman at the Cosmos Club should feel shame at misjudging 
Franklin. This shame is the not only the result of making a false judgment, it is the result of 
knowing you made a false judgment because you were judging someone according to their race. 
This is an immoral judgement. 
 The perspectivalist position relies on two claims: most knowledge is a product of 
judgement calls rather than coming directly from perception or deductive reasoning, and anyone 
giving a judgment relies on their own specific experiences. What a person finds relevant in any 
given situation will be determined by what has been relevant to them in the past and as such what 
appears to one person as warrant, can possibly not appear at another person at all.19 This position 
escapes the problem of relativity by asserting that judgments from any situation would still be 
subject to challenge. By correlating knowledge to personal experience factors such as “the 
individual’s social location or social identity, habits of perceptual attention,” become salient in 
the discussion of what we can know and when we can know it (Alcoff 2007, 41).  
Harding describes feminist standpoint theory as, “a kind of organic epistemology, 
methodology, philosophy of science, and social theory that can arise whenever oppressed 
peoples gain public voice” (Harding 2004, 3). It claims that specific communities have their own 
epistemic situation, with members of oppressed groups having “fewer reasons to fool themselves 
                                               
19 EI has received a lot of criticism on grounds of relativism. It would be remise to not include 
some defense against this legitimate concern. 
27 
 
about this being the best of all possible worlds and have strong motivations to gain a clear-eyed 
assessment of their society” (Alcoff 2007, 43). This claim is less about the individual’s situation 
but on the significance of identifying with a social groups (gender, race, etc.) on epistemic 
practices. On this position, what we do not know, our ignorance, can be patterned according to 
social and group identities (Alcoff 2007, 47). This critique focuses mainly on the differences in 
the epistemic situation of men versus women. Harding contends that women must be attentive to 
more things owing to the fact that they occupy a vulnerable position in society. They have the 
same material concerns of their male counterparts but also a decidedly more oppressed position.   
Feminist standpoint theory claims that the conceptual frameworks of western traditions 
produce systematic ignorance of oppressed groups including ignorance of their lives and 
ignorance of the oppression they suffer. The first step in creating a feminist epistemology would 
be generating knowledge of the oppressive system, how it works and why it works. Thus 
feminist epistemologists would need to be adept not only with their own alternative 
epistemology20 but with the traditional epistemology they are attempting to break out of. The 
next step in the project is to start research from women’s experiences: mothering, marginality, 
violence against women, women’s labor, etc. The goal is to identify intersections of social 
locations wherein common experiences of marginalized groups may be found. The ultimate 
objective would be to “transform a source of oppression into a source of knowledge and potential 
liberation” (Harding 2004, 10).  
In “Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge”, Kukla advances a more 
comprehensive perspectivalism that focuses on the individual perceptual capacities of epistemic 
agents. She argues that objectivity and perspectivalism are not mutually exclusive concepts. The 




question under contention here is whether or not there needs to be democratic warrant for claims 
in order for them to count at objective. In arguing that there need not be democratic warrant for 
objective claims we can address for the possibility of “some social positions yielding better, 
more objective perceptual possibilities than others” (Kukla 2006, p. 82). Kukla argues that 
aperspectivalism is not necessary for objectivity, but that taking perspective in account is 
imperative for objectivity. The problem with this is determining which social positions have 
access to perspectives that yield more objective perceptions. It cannot be the case that every 
person’s perspective is objective because that can lead to the terrifying possibility of giving 
epistemic authority to racist/sexist positions21.  
Kukla, like many other feminist/critical race epistemologists, advocates for an 
Aristotelian account of perception. According to them, there is no reason to think that Aristotle’s 
theory of moral perception, should not apply to perception in general. If we allow this possibility, 
then perception is an exercise of reason, not simply the tool by which information regarding the 
world is gathered and delivered to our reasoning capacities. Truth is not perspectival, it is 
independent of the observer, but different perspectives can yield different rational access to the 
truth (Kukla, Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge 2006, 87). Perceiving things 
accurately as they actually are in the world is itself a rational capacity and must be something 
that can be learned or educated for it to count as a virtue.  
Although the problem is of the perceptual abilities of the individual agent, it is not within 
the individual’s ability to improve their perceptual abilities and tendencies on their own. Kukla 
maintains that we must look to others in certain situations what might be in a better epistemic 
position to check our own perceptions. Suppose I am a man that wants to work on what I know 
                                               
21 This is a concern that Mills points out in Alternative Epistemologies (1988). 
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to be implicit biases in my own cognition. How would I do this? Perhaps I would consult with a 
friend, who is in a better epistemic position to understand the given situation because they are a 
woman. Kukla claims that situations like these are akin to asking a doctor how to look at 
diagnostic images and a critic to tell me where to find the best food in the city. Social perception 
occurs in the same fashion and requires developing a proper theoretical framework. At first, a 
perceiver would have to rely on the judgments of others, perhaps an individual, perhaps a 
community, and eventually they will have become adept enough to make more reliable 
judgements on their own.   
Kukla claims that by allowing ourselves to be educated by other perceivers that are in a 
more epistemologically virtuous position we can develop the same types of perceptual skills. In 
fact this is already done on a daily basis, most extensively in the scientific community, but also 
in the society at large.22 We already look to the experts to gain expertise because we are 
cognizant that they are seeing something we do not (Kukla 2006, p. 89). Although we should in 
principle be taught to perceive things in a more virtuous way, there are certain things that hinder 
this possibility including, “Insouciance, inattention, impairment, and biases and prejudices that 
block or distort certain kinds of information (Kukla 2006, 87).  It is our epistemic responsibility 
to cultivate our perceptual capabilities. An added benefit of Kukla’s position is that she does not 
differentiate between social cognition and cognition generally. When she discusses improving 
perceptual abilities this refers to all of perception, not only perception of other people from 
different social groups.  
                                               




Why is this relevant to our project of implicit bias? Going back to the Cosmos Club 
example, Gendler says the woman made a mistake but it was not an epistemically vicious one. 
On Kukla’s account of perception, the Cosmos club was guilty of an epistemically vicious 
mistake. In Kukla’s words, “We need to take it as an epistemic failure and not just a piece of bad 
luck if we are unable to access warrant that others seem able to access. Likewise, occupying a 
perspective that enables accurate, objective perception is an achievement and not just a given 
feature of our found location” (Kukla, Objectivity and Perspective in Empirical Knowledge 
2006, 88). Gendler is relying on the warrant afforded the epistemic agent by base-rate 
information whereas Kukla is considering the warrant afforded by perceptual experience. The 
perception of Franklin’s tuxedo is the warrant for the correct judgment of his club membership.  
Interpreting the Cosmos Club example through Kukla does not quite get us to where we 
need to be as far as motivating a negative implicit bias. What we are really looking for here is not 
that some positions are better able to access things as warrant, but that certain positions 
necessitate the inattention in order to preserve a view of the world in which they maintain a 
privileged position. This is the epistemic crime I am accusing the Cosmos Club woman of. The 
answer to this question is not going to be found in perspectivalism and feminist standpoint theory 
alone. 
Feminist standpoint theory utilizes perspectivalism to validate the claim that men are 
necessarily ignorance of women’s lives by virtue of not being women but this does not talk about 
exclusion in the right way. They claim that women are excluded as knowers, such as when their 
testimony is pushed aside. Woman are also set up as having a positive condition for knowledge. 
However, they do not engage with the important question of how evidence can be excluded from 
perception due to your perspective. In other words, the feminist standpoint position does not 
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require us to talk about perception as an editing process. It could accommodate such an account 
of implicit bias, but it just as easily can accommodate the positive implicit bias of Gendler. 
Therefore, in order to get at how ignorance acts on us as perceivers we must look to 
epistemologies of ignorance.  
2.2 Epistemologies of Ignorance and Negative Implicit Bias 
In the effort of arriving at a negative implicit bias I will now utilize the work of Charles 
Mills and Jose Medina on epistemologies of ignorance. The central claim of epistemologists of 
ignorance is that ignorance is active. It is something we engage in doing and also something that 
acts as a force on us. Mills’ work is very distinct from the situatedness of knowledge that the 
perspectivalists and feminist standpoint theories advocate for because racism is the result of 
failures in cognition due to ignorance. Ignorance is a causal force rather than the result of 
occupying a particular social position. He does not claim that all beliefs are subject to this type of 
ignorance. His proposition is much narrower and focuses on racism and sexism. 
 Mills’ theory incorporates the ideas of perspectivalism and feminist standpoint theory 
but takes it a step further. Linda Alcoff explains Mills’ position as not one in which there is a 
lack as in the first case (lack of personal experience) or in the second (lack of motivation due to 
social position), instead the dominant social group has specific epistemic practices that 
perpetuate ignorance. Racism on this account, is a “type of subjectivity that forms identifiable 
patterns23 of perceptual attentiveness and supplies belief-influencing premises that result in a 
distorted or faulty account of reality” (Alcoff 2007, 48). This would amount to an epistemology 
that is geared toward maintaining a particular faulty view of the world. This faulty view of the 
world Mills is the essence of “white ignorance”. White ignorance promotes the idea of 
                                               
23 My emphasis. 
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individualistic explanations for success which provides support for the claims of white 
supremacy. Whites are more educated, have had more significant achievements, they occupy 
more positions of power. White ignorance consists of obfuscating the fact that this is made 
possible by the privileged position in society they hold.24 
His focus is on the structural nature of oppressive systems and the perpetuation of 
ignorance as a “sustainable epistemic practice”. For feminist standpoint theorists the focus is 
maintained on gendered relations of power and the implications on knowledge practices, whereas 
Mills is concerned with how race plays a significant factor in systematic ignorance. Mills’ thesis 
is that whites have a decidedly positive interest in keeping the oppressive systems in place which 
consists of “seeing wrongly”. This seeing wrongly consists in a “collective amnesia” regarding 
the achievements of marginalized groups (people of color) and the atrocities afflicted upon them. 
 Mills points out that that cognitive science tells us that, “the lack of appropriate concepts 
can hinder learning, interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct explanation, and 
perpetuate problems.” (Mills 1997, 6). He therefore proposes that the social contract theory that 
has played a huge role in developing western political thought has left out a very important 
detail, namely race. Mills explores how the exclusion of race from social contract theory leads to 
problems in its normative theories and practices. The veil of ignorance, proposed by John Rawls 
is supposed to ensure that when establishing a social contract no one is cognizant of their 
particular position in society. This includes being ignorance of your race, ethnicity, socio 
economic position, etc. such that when creating rules for your society you do not create an 
institution that favors those in your position at the deficit of others (Rawls 1971). Mills argues 
                                               




that the veil of ignorance is not the great equalizer it was intended to be. Rather, introducing this 
veil of ignorance exacerbates the problem by not addressing, even erasing, the monumental 
influence race has on political thought. We do not need more ignorance, we need less.  
Regarding the power of ignorance, Mills claims that ignorance is a tool for oppression. 
There are two ways of accomplishing this task 1) not allowing the marginalized groups to know 
and 2) keeping the center powers ignorant, consciously or unconsciously, of the injustices they 
inflict on the marginalized. Although ignorance is used as a tool for the powerful, at the same 
time it can be a resource of survival for the victimized. (Tuana 2007). The ignorance of the 
oppressive system regarding those it oppresses allows the oppressed to sometimes remain unseen 
and therefore escape. This escape might manifest as ignorance of their own oppression in order 
to be content. 
We can connect Mills to Kukla’s perspectivalism through the work of Jose Medina. Like 
Kukla, Medina adopts an Aristotelian account of perception. He builds upon the foundations laid 
by feminist standpoint theorists and Mills but he goes further to describe how social positions 
engender particular epistemic virtues and vices. He clarifies epistemic vice as, “a set of corrupted 
attitudes and dispositions that get in the way of knowledge” and epistemic virtue as, “a set of 
attitudes and dispositions that facilitates the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge” 
(Medina 2013, 30). Rather than fixating on how the privileged class has access to certain benefits 
such as educational institutions and serving as credible authorities, with the oppressed having the 
opposite, Medina proposes specific disadvantages of the privileged and the advantages of the 
oppressed. 
The epistemic vices of the privileged include epistemic arrogance, laziness, and closed-
mindedness. (Medina 2013, 39). The epistemic virtues of the oppressed include epistemic 
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humility, curiosity/diligence, and open-mindedness (Medina 2013, 42). It is not the case that 
everyone who is a member of an oppressed group possesses all of the virtues and none of the 
vices they can even be developed25. Those who lack virtues may cultivate them by experiencing 
"beneficial epistemic friction," which forces the knower to grapple with alternative views and 
generates dissonance that might cause a change in her beliefs or habits. 
Medina elucidates that ignorance is active, which he describes thusly, "one's participation 
in the collective bodies of ignorance one has inherited becomes active, because one acts on it and 
fails to act against it, whether one knows it or not, and whether one wills it or not" (Medina 
2013, 140). Implicit bias is one result of ignorance, of ignorance causes us to “mis-see”, which is 
something that acts on us and also something that we ourselves do (Mills 2007).  
The contrast between feminist standpoint theory/perspectivalism and epistemologies of 
ignorance can now be articulated more clearly. For the feminist standpoint theorists, knowledge 
is situational. Some people have better access to particular knowledge than others because of 
what appears to them as warrant. On the epistemology of ignorance account, ignorance is not the 
lack of knowledge but the de-selecting of salient details because it is not in accordance with your 
faulty view of the world.  
Kukla’s insistence on perception as a rational capacity maps perfectly onto the picture 
provided by Mills; and Medina’s theories. Medina already places us into this framework of 
considering the different epistemic virtues and vices that are cultivated in social positions of 
                                               
25 Medina can be accused of romanticizing oppressed groups by claiming that they possess all of 
the epistemic virtues. He is not claiming that they necessarily have these virtues, rather that they 
have a decided interest in being more attentive to various types of evidence. Of course, many 
members of oppressed groups could have considerable interest in being less attentive to evidence 
of their own oppression. For the purposes of this paper I am not going to challenge Medina on 
his assignment of epistemic virtues and vices, especially because it is in accordance with the 
literature on standpoint theories.  
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power and oppression. Mills critiques traditional western political thought for perpetuating bad 
perceptual tendencies such that the “rational” basis for white privilege can be maintained. An 
epistemology of ignorance is an epistemology in which we are teaching that “misperception” is 
objective perception.   
 In “Alternate Epistemologies” Charles Mills claims that proponents of EI, “do not see 
themselves as offering alternate analyzes within the conventional framework of memory, 
perception, truth, belief, etc.” (Mills 1988, 237). This is a problem for EI, just as it is for Gendler, 
because perception, and how it is allocated through attention, is undeniably important for the 
study of implicit bias. Ignorance is performing work, but what kind of work? The work is 
perceptual in nature. The ideal work of perception is to provide us with accurate information of 
the world around us. Presumably, we would have certain expectations of what our environment 
is supposed to be like, then this can either be verified or adjusted according to the information we 
received via our perceptions. Unfortunately, we know that we do not often, if ever, function 
ideally. This leaves us to determine how our perception is actually working when it is not 
functioning it should.  
We can either add to our perceptual content things that are not there (as in the Trump 
Glasses example) or we can subtract things from perceptual content that actually is there (John 
Hope Franklin’s tuxedo in the Cosmos Club example). When does addition happen versus 
subtraction? Is one more harmful than the other? In the case of Gendler, we might become aware 
of the additions to our perceptions. In some cases, such as the Skywalk example, it is quite 
obvious and alarming that we are experiencing something that we do not rationally endorse. In 
cases of subtraction, where we do not see something that is in plain sight, there would not be the 
same sort of cognitive dissonance that happens on the Skywalk. On the one hand, Gendler’s 
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account is worrisome because there is little chance of improvement if you are unwilling to incur 
an epistemic cost. However, what chance of improvement is there when you are, quite literally, 
blind to the problem?  
In every account provided of EI there has been an emphasis on perceptual attention, but 
none of the theorists discussed actually delve into cognitive science to determine how being a 
part of a group identity can shape the manner in which you allocate your perceptual resources. 
The next chapter will explore research from cognitive science that describes attentional 
processes. I hypothesize that bottom-up and top-down attentional systems demonstrate a parallel 
between positive and negative implicit bias and understanding them as separate systems may 
















 CHAPTER 3 
ARE YOU PAYING ATTENTION? A SPECULATIVE LOOK INTO ATTENTION AND 
BLINDNESS 
 
 The previous chapter presented an argument for why we should consider epistemologists 
of ignorance forwarding an account of implicit bias as inattentional blindness, more specifically 
as a purposeful inattention to evidence that would contradict the carefully constructed system of 
power in which we exist. Researchers studying attention are concerned on what makes us attend 
to certain things over others. How our attention captured, and how it is sustained thereafter, are 
their main concerns. The question they are trying to answer is, what perceptual inputs are 
relevant and which ones are not?  
 The literature on attention is vast and does not currently have a strong consensus. Some 
of the questions plaguing cognitive scientists today regarding attention include; does it occur 
early? Late? How much influence do top-down processes have on attention? Bottom-up? Both? 
Most of the research is concerned with the conditions for attention. They are looking for the 
answer as to why we notice some things and not others. We might draw a comparison here 
between how attention and implicit bias are traditionally considered. The treatment of posit ive 
implicit bias in current research is similar to studies on attention. They both set up positive 
conditions for perception. In positive implicit bias, going back to aliefs and the RAB structure, 
we are seeing a representation of some object, proposition, etc. and have an implicitly associated 
affective and behavior response. Typical accounts of attention concern themselves with what we 
see and why those attended to objects capture our attention. Attention, like positive implicit bias, 
is always directed towards something, some object, person, or location. Negative implicit bias 
however, does not share this characteristic of having an object to be directed at. It is rather a 
problem of directing your attention away from some object or representation. 
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 This chapter will give a short survey of attention, focusing on top-down and bottom-up 
processes of attention allocation. The latter relates to conditions external of the agent that capture 
attention such as the color, size and shape of objects. The former refers to internal conditions of 
the observer such as past experience, semantic knowledge, and task orientation to determine 
what becomes the focus of attentional resources. Top-down processes, as we will see, constitute 
the brunt of the evidence for why inattentional blindness occurs.  
 The latter half of this chapter will forward the perceptual cycle model of attention, where 
top-down and bottom-up processes occur in a feedback loop. The top-down processes appear in 
the form of schemata which form a general picture of the situation the observer finds themselves 
in, and an attention set is formed according to the observer’s schema. An attention set serves as a 
plan for distributing attention appropriately. When evidence is gathered via perception, 
determined by the attention set, it can lead to the refinement of the attention set, modification of 
it, or the adoption of a new attention set to accommodate new evidence. This presents a checks 
and balances relationship between our schema of how we think the world should appear, and the 
visual perception of how it actually appears to us. Inattentional blindness results when the 
observer’s attention set does not adequately adjust itself according to the evidence. If the schema 
is not adjusted, or abandoned, it will not redirect attention to the stimuli that have become 
relevant. This could provide us with a perceptual model of how negative implicit bias occurs. I 
will additionally, present some justification for the claim that inattentional blindness can occur at 
the conceptual level, which would necessarily have to be the case in order to form an account of 





3.1  Bottom-Up vs. Top-down Inattention 
 Before we can delve into our model of attention we must first distinguish between 
bottom-up and top-down attentional processes. Bottom-up, or stimulus-driven attention26, is 
described as, “passive, reflexive and involuntary” (Carrasco 2011). Bottom-up attention is 
captured by the salience of stimuli without any necessary directedness on the part of the 
observer. It is often thought of as being phylogenetically older in that it is beneficial in quick 
time responses which are necessary in survival situations.  
 Top-down attention, also called goal-oriented attention27, refers to attention that is 
voluntarily allocated by the observer. It is usually thought of as being controlled and sustained by 
the observer according to the task they are attempting to engage in (Pinto, et al. 2013). Top-down 
attention is influenced by an observer’s past experience, semantic knowledge, goals, etc. The 
relationship between top-down and bottom-up processes is controversial in cognitive science. 
Some argue that the initial capture of attention is stimulus-driven and only after that can the goal-
oriented attentional processes engage with visual selection (Theeuwes 2010). Others argue that 
top-down mechanisms serve as the initial directors of attention by establishing an attention set 
(S. Most, D. J. Simons, et al. 2005).    
 The research on inattentional blindness is directed towards determining what will “break 
through” the blindness. They are concerned with the conditions for capturing attention or 
awareness28. Experiments in attention manipulation have found that attention actively performs 
                                               
26 Also, referred to as exogenous attention which stresses the reliance on external cues to capture 
attention and awareness. 
27 Additionally, this is named endogenous attention wherein the cue is internal.   
28 Attention capture and awareness capture are not the same thing. Attention can be captured 
implicitly without any conscious awareness. To simplify things, when I mention attention 
capture in this paper I be referring to instances in which attention and awareness are captured. 
40 
 
work in the suppression of information that would be disruptive to the observer. For example, the 
distractor suppression formulation of external noise reduction states, “attention affects 
performance in a given area by actively suppressing the strength of representation for areas 
outside its locus” (Carrasco 2011). However, researchers have yet to address situations in which 
inattention is a mechanism of exclusion of information that does not accord with how we see the 
world, in effect making us blind to counter-examples. Inattentional blindness is also interpreted 
as resulting from limited attentional capacity, such as when your attention is directed towards a 
task you tune out the irrelevant stimuli that might distract you. Capacity is not the only cause of 
inattentional blindness. Expectation of a stimulus can also play a role in whether or not your 
attention will be captured. The cause of inattentional blindness that concerns us here is that 
which is caused by attention sets. Attention sets serve as plans for the distribution of attention to 
particular items. Attentional sets are a top-down process and are usually the result of past 
experiences and habits. They can be adjusted quickly in response to new evidence, and can be 
specific to any number of situations and environments.  
 The next section will explore a model of attention that is highly dependent upon attention 
sets. I will argue that this model is the best method for considering how implicit bias as 
inattentional blindness occurs because this model has been resurrected recently to account for 
inattentional blindness at the conceptual level, which is what will be needed to construct a model 
for implicit bias. 
3.2  One System: Perceptual Cycle Model 
 The perceptual cycle model consists of a feedback loop between bottom-up visual 
processing and top-down processing. According to the perceptual cycle model, conscious 
perception is a gradual, constructive process, rather than an all or none phenomenon. Observers 
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have schemas, or expectations for what belongs in the scene (i.e., which objects should be 
present, what they should look like, etc.), which are modified by information in the environment. 
These schemas guide attention, thereby allowing the observer to pick up more information from 
the scene. As observers gain more details about the objects in the world, they accommodate their 
schemas to these details and adjust subsequent visual exploration appropriately (Most and 
Simons 2001, 160). 
 The perceptual cycle model has two central principles which are that the conscious 
awareness of a stimulus accumulates gradually, and the observer plays and active role in this 
process. Therefore, awareness of a stimulus requires a degree of sustained processing and unless 
it is incorporated into a cycle of expectation and exploration, it might not be “seen” at all. In 
order for unexpected stimuli to be seen they must either modify the existing perceptual cycle or 
trigger the formation of a new cycle. (Most and Simons 2001, 161). Forming a new cycle can be 
very quick and simple, such as the sudden onset of a loud noise, or bright lights. In other 
instances it is much harder. Engaging in other attention demanding tasks, a perceptual cycle in 
itself, would reduce the chances of noticing an unexpected stimulus because to do so would 
require the interruption of the cycle the subject is engaged in. The failure to perceive an 
unexpected stimulus would be the result of the failure to interrupt/modify a perceptual cycle.  
 A schema is held by the observer and informs a person about the objects or people one is 
likely to encounter in a particular situation. The schema can be relatively basic for instance, in an 
office one expects to find things like computers and desks and does not expect to find a disco 
ball. The observer’s schema will help them to adopt an attention set which, “determines which 
specific objects or features the observer will attend to and then guides sustained attention to 
those aspects of the scene consistent with the attention set” (Most and Simons 2001, 167). The 
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attention set allows the observer to gather new information. The new information will be added 
to the attention set and the scene will build gradually with the accumulation of more information. 
 Schema are very beneficial to cognition because schemata are the semantic knowledge 
we can access in a given situation (groupings, generalizations, etc.). These are necessary in order 
to form judgments in a timely manner and with less effort. A judgment can be more easily made 
when we have pre-established groups into which new phenomenon can be incorporated. 29 They 
are more prone to error, but the benefit of making quicker decisions outweighs the potential for 
wrong judgment. 
 The benefits of this conception attention is that it does not rely on the features of the 
objects perceived, but on the top-down schema that an individual brings to bear on a situation30. 
The effect on perception due to implicit bias is the result of a schema that incorporates social 
injustice as objective truths rather than as errors in epistemological practices. I might here be 
accused of taking the perceptual model too far, in the sense that I am applying it to much higher 
level processes than it is intended. Indeed, most of the research on attention focuses on features 
that distinguish one item or another, not the conceptual category that some item occupies rather 
than another. The next section will provide a brief justification for this move. 
 
 
                                               
29 Gendler discusses the benefits and problems of schemata (though she does not use this word). 
Gendler claims that encoding base-rates and background knowledge about social groups lead to 
aliefs which are active in perception. Background knowledge is just another work for schemata. 
We can then view Gendler as possibly fitting into this model.  
30 At first glance this appears to be the same general story that proponents of the cognitive 
penetration of perception are telling. However, the cognitive penetrationist maintains that in 
order for an instance of cognitive penetration to occur, an individual must be capable of having a 
different experience while attending to the same stimuli. The question of how/why your attention 
is allocated to a particular stimulus is never in question. Top-down processing on perception  
43 
 
3.3  Attentional Sets: Where is the glass ceiling?  
 Although the majority of studies performed up to now have focused on featural properties 
of the objects attended or not attended to in order to determine what types of features (or 
combination of features) can capture our attention in particular tasks, there have been a few 
studies directed at determining if higher level conceptual categories can also be a part of an 
attentional set and direct attention. The answer has been yes. According to cognitive scientist 
Steven Most, what you see is what you set (S. Most, D. J. Simons, et al. 2005). It has been 
accepted since the famous studies on inattentional blindness performed by Mack and Rock 
(1998) that there is no perception without attention. Attentional sets serve as a plan of action for 
attention in a situation. Unexpected stimuli are more likely to be notices if they are featurally 
similar to items in the attention set. Those items that are too dissimilar are likely to go unnoticed.  
 One last step lies before us before we can apply what we have discovered regarding 
attention sets to our definition of implicit bias. We must determine whether or not attention sets 
can function at a high conceptual level. Typical inattentional blindness tasks focus on simply 
features such as color. Some recent studies indicate that attentional sets can function at the 
conceptual level as well. One such study measured how well participants were able to identify a 
stimulus as either a letter or a number when they were primed with an attention set of either 
letters or numbers. The participants are told to look for either letters or numbers. While they are 
completing this task they are confronted with an unexpected stimulus. This takes the form of a 3 
or an E. Both of these stimuli have the same features, three horizontal lines and one vertical line, 
and appear as mirror images of each other. The results were as follows. 
 
 The attentional set effect was stronger when the unexpected object was an ‘E’ than when 
 it was a ‘3’ possibly because a block-letter character is more readily identifiable when it 
 is an ‘E’ than when it is a ‘3’. Consistent with this interpretation, some noticers described 
44 
 
 the unexpected ‘3’ as a ‘‘backwards E’’. When the unexpected object was an ‘E’, 71% of 
 those attending to letters noticed it on the critical trial and only 39% of those attending to 
 numbers did. (S. Most 2013) 
  
The assumption underlying this experiment is that in order to distinguish between two things that 
are as featurally similar as the number 3 and the letter E the observer must have a pre-employed 
concept for the image to be categorized under. Those that were attending to letters, which our 
minds have been trained since childhood to recognize, more easily noticed the stimulus, and they 
noticed it as an E even when it genuinely appeared as the number 3.  
 After several similar trials, Most concludes that attentional sets can be conceptual rather 
than simply feature-based and claims, “Although feature-based attentional set powerfully 
influences conscious perception, a potentially simultaneous factor shaping visual awareness 
might be the way that people prioritize certain categories over others.” (S. Most 2013). A typical 
example used to describe feature-based attentional sets explain the inattentional blindness 
suffered by car drivers for motorcycles to be the result of motorcycles not possessing the similar 
features of a car. Car drivers are being attentive, but what they are being attentive to are features 
that would correspond to other cars on the road. Therefore, when they are confronted with an 
image of a motorcycle that does not possess all of the defining features of a car, they are less able 
to see it. A conceptual-based attention set can explain the same phenomenon while maintaining 
the importance in differences of features between objects. This explanation would be that the car 
driver is focusing their attention on the concept of “car” as well as car features and this is the 
reason why the motorcycle is not noticed.31 
                                               
31 This seems related to the question of perception as seeing that, and seeing something as. 
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 Additionally, Most’s study supports the hypothesis that unexpected objects undergo fairly 
advanced level of analysis prior to being selected for awareness.32 If true, this conclusion, in 
conjunction with the perceptual cycle model of attention, could plausibly support our definition 
of negative implicit bias in which evidence is de-selected for because it would provide counter 
examples to biases sustained by privileged ignorance.  
3.4  Retelling the Cosmos Club Story One Final Time 
 We have seen that the perceptual cycle model claims that there is a feedback loop 
between a person’s top-down attentional sets and their bottom-up perceptual data. Attentional 
sets are influenced by past experience and habitation. An attentional set must also align with a 
person’s general schema of the situation at hand, but it should ideally be modified according to 
new information gathered by observation.  
  I will now apply the perceptual cycle model to The Cosmos Club example to see how we 
might employ the model to inform us about negative implicit bias. The woman at the Cosmos 
Club has a task to complete. She must get her coat check from an attendant. We might suppose 
that this woman has been at the club before, due to having base-rate information regarding club 
membership, and has asked for her coat check from an attendant during her previous visits. This 
woman has prior knowledge of what attendance at this club look like such as their features and 
attire.33 Her schema of the Cosmos club informs her to expect that there are no black members in 
the Cosmos club, and to expect that all the attendants are black. Her attentional set, directing her 
attention in order to accomplish her task of getting the coat check, is directed towards finding a 
                                               
32 A similar study was performed by (Guo, You and Li 2016) in which they tested for differences 
in inattentional blindness in identifying a chinese character or a picture. 
33 Gendler certainly suggests this when she claims that the woman has access to base-rate 
information that tells her there are few, if any, black members of the club and that all the 
attendants are black.  
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black man, because the schema tells her that black men are attendants. When she finds a black 
man, John Hope Franklin, she hands him her coat check. We know the rest of the story from 
here, John Hope Franklin informs the woman that she has misidentified him as an attendant. 
What we should be asking here is, why did the woman not adjust her schema after realizing that 
she made a mistake?  
 Perhaps the woman did adjust her schema for that particular night, in that particular club, 
to account for a black member of the Cosmos Club. Let us say she did. The next time she tried to 
approach an attendant she was careful, looking at the person’s dress as well as their race, before 
deciding to hand her coat check to them. Do we think that her overall schema regarding the 
general attendance at prestigious clubs was changed? From what we know about the 
intransigence of racial biases we may assume this answer to be no. These biases are constantly 
reinforced by the mainstream media and other individuals. The next time she enters a similar 
situation she is likely to be functioning under the same biases and therefore the same schema. 
However, if she was never confronted by Franklin, never forced to face the error in her 
judgment, her schema would never have the opportunity to be revised in any way. The problem 
that inattentional blindness possess to correcting our implicit biases is a powerful one because we 
cannot revise our beliefs and behavior based on evidence that is not perceived.   
 The purpose of this chapter was not to provide a definite theory of attention, but only to 
point out a plausible one that could be explored through further research. Experiments in 
inattentional blindness have yet to set their sights in such a lofty direction, however it is credible, 
considering the research that has already been performed, that we may possess most of the tools 
we need to pursue such a task. The difficulty lies in designing an experiment that could measure 
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attention sets determined by higher level cognitive processes. The evidence suggests that 
attention sets can be formed at this level, but it has not yet been measured.  
  Creating a distinction between Gendler’s automatic, valenced formulation of implicit 
bias and implicit bias that is the result of the influence of top-down cognition on perception, 
allows us to maintain that we have an epistemic duty to correct for our implicit biases. Harkening 
back to epistemologies of ignorance, social privilege creates a faulty view of the world upon 
which our epistemological practices are built. This faulty picture serves as the schema for 
establishing our attentional sets. Theoretically, we should be able to modify this faulty picture 
and out attention sets would adjust according. It is not only possible for us to do this, but it is our 



















 This thesis was a project with the objective of bridging the gap between several disparate 
disciplines. In conclusion I would like to reiterate the arguments made in this paper and indicate 
the direction that future research can take. The first chapter took a survey of implicit bias 
research in psychology and engaged with Tamar Gendler’s proposal of aliefs. Based on her 
description I claimed that she was advocating for a model of implicit bias that consists of an 
addition or distortion to visual perception. I then explored implications of this model, including 
the tenacity of the additions to visual perception (affect and behavior) in the face of conflicting 
evidence and beliefs. Ultimately, I argued that her primary example does not support her model 
of implicit bias and later reinterpreted her example to motivate an additional model of implicitly 
biased perception.  
 Combining the Cosmos Club example with alternative epistemologies, the second chapter 
demonstrates the importance of perspectival knowledge in formulating a model of implicit bias. 
Attention research indicates that executive control of attentional processes is motivated by top-
down processes, and therefore the personal experiences, habits, and biases of the observer must 
necessarily be taken into account. Rather than focusing on individual differences in perceptual 
capacities and cognitive biases, I claimed that the occurrences of implicit bias in particular social 
groups (white, wealthy, etc.) demonstrates that the loci of measurable difference in perspective is 
at the intersection between different social groups determined by race, gender, age, sexuality, etc. 
After establishing the indispensability of group perspective, I then argued for a model of implicit 
bias as inattentional bias.  
 The final chapter proposes a theory of inattentional blindness in which inattention is 
produced when a stimulus differs too significantly from the attention set that you are utilizing, 
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suggests that future research on inattentional blindness should focus on furthering our 
understanding of attentional sets and how they interact with/are determined by higher level 
cognitive processes.  
 The objective of project was to demonstrate two things. First, it should have 
demonstrated that that research into implicit bias is only in its infancy. We do not yet have an 
adequate theory of who is biased, why they are biased, and what type of responsibility we have 
towards correcting for our biases. Secondly, it should have made it apparent that creating a 
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